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1. Introduction
In his book “Politics of Globalisation”, Ulrich Beck1
asks what would happen if the European Union were to
apply for membership of the European Union. In Beck’s
view, the EU’s application would be rejected owing to
its lack of democratic structures.
But what about the Member States themselves?
This rather naïve question is much more difficult to
answer because – although the Member States of the
European Union are certainly democratic states – they
are being deprived more and more of their capacities to
act as sovereign democratic states.
The Member States have had to face up to this
reality for years. The environmental sector serves as just
one example: up to 90% of all environmental legal acts
within the national legal systems are of EU origin and
national parliaments have – at least in these areas –
sometimes nothing other to do than to simply transform
European directives into national legislation.2
This “decline” of national parliaments has been
only gradually compensated by the strengthening of the
powers of the European Parliament. For example, legal
activity in the legislative process has drastically decreased
over the last few years in the environmental sector.
Legal activity is still maintained in the executive process,
but here legal acts (the so-called implementation acts)
are decided by national experts together with the
European Commission and the European Parliament is
excluded. In this respect, one could say that the growing
importance of the European Parliament within the
legislative process has – at least in the environmental
field – not really increased the powers of the European
Parliament as more and more decisions are delegated to
the Commission (in the so-called comitology
committees) and the Member States.
In addition, both the European Parliament and the
national parliaments have to implement more and more
international treaties and conventions which have been
decided by experts in international organisations (such
as United Nations, NATO, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, the G-7). Today, already
28% of all proposals of the European Commission have
their origin in international treaties (which have to be
implemented in the Community).3 This present trend
towards “denationalisation” and “deparliamentarisation”
will further increase as decisions are taken more and
more at international and global level. As a result the
role of the executives will be heightened and a new form
of international elite will be created with the
responsibility for decision-making.
Historically, the “Act”, “Loi” or “Gesetz” has first
of all symbolised its source, namely the will of the
people, and then its effect, namely its supremacy over
the monarch’s ordering powers.4 Today, international
organisations have become the monarch and the people
have – through their parliaments – lost their supremacy
when deciding on an “Act”, “Loi” or “Gesetz”. In this
respect, one might say that the national parliamentarians
are increasingly turning into executive policy-makers
who have to obey international obligations. One might
even say that we are entering a post-parliamentary age
where national parliaments are losing decision-making
powers and the European Parliament only partially
compensates for this loss of sovereignty.
The process of “governance without government”
or “governance without legitimacy” in international
organisations (and agencies) is becoming both necessary
and ever more problematic.
At European Union level, the role of the national
administrations and of national civil servants in the
environmental sector (at European level), in particular
within the executive process, has – surprisingly – up till
now received very little attention from the scientific
sector. The reason for this lack of interest relates partly
to the structure of the Treaty itself; committees in the
environmental sector are not mentioned in the Treaties.
Art. 157 2 TEC states that in the performance of its
duties the European Commission shall neither seek nor
take instructions from any government or other body.
Each Member State must respect this principle and not
seek to influence the members of the Commission in the
performance of their tasks. Art. 157 2 TEC therefore
supports the view that the Commission is a hermetic
body which does not provide links to the Member States
(e.g. by establishing committees). This image of the
Commission ignores some basic features of the
proceedings in the Commission (and the Council). The
traditional view of the Commission is that it is the sole
executor of Community policies. Curiously, there is
nothing in the treaties to suggest that the Commission
should have the exclusive right to manage Community
policy and to take decisions of an executive nature. It is
more the case that Community policies are normally
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managed by the Commission under powers conferred
by secondary legislation adopted by the Council and
delegated to the Commission under Art. 145 3 TEC.
As regards the Council, Art. 145 TEC stipulates
that it shall “have power to take decisions”. The Council
is therefore widely understood as being the legislative
body of the EC. This presumption is misleading. In
reality, the Council is the main source of legislation but
it also exercises executive powers (and is a more or less
permanent negotiating forum in which, below the level
of a Ministers meeting, Coreper and working party
meetings create a spirit of multinational cooperation).
Over the last few years there has been a significant
trend, particularly within the European Union, towards
a mutual interweaving, intermixing, interlinking and
merging between the national and Community levels.5
Particularly at Community level, the political decision-
making process is becoming ever more labyrinthine, as
it were, and decisions are increasingly the result of
negotiations within informal or formalised networks. In
1997, 10950 meetings (an increase of 1.3% on the
previous year) were organised by the European
Institutions and other European bodies. The Joint
Interpreting and Conference Service provided 138,000
interpreter days (9% more than in 1996).6 The multi-
level interaction of civil servants from national and
international administrations has thus reinforced the
trend towards the “sharing” or “fusing” of powers
between bureaucrats and politicians.7
In an increasing number of areas, national civil
servants are becoming involved in expert committees of
the Commission who advise the Commission in
preparing proposals (within the legislative process),
working groups of the Council (composed of civil
servants) whose task is to prepare the meetings of
COREPER and the Council of Ministers (within the
legislative process) and comitology committees whose
task is to implement (within the executive process) the
legal acts decided upon by the Council or by the Council
and the Parliament.8 In the environmental sector, there
are approximately 100 consultative committees
composed of national civil servants and other experts
assisting the Commission in shaping proposals put to
the Council.9 It is difficult to create an exact picture as
to the number of expert committees of the Commission
and their activities in the environmental sector. The
Commission differentiates between 5 special committees
created by legal act, 65 permanent expert groups of the
Commission and 35 ad-hoc expert groups. With respect
to this differentiation, it is worth mentioning that in the
Anglopharm case,10 the Court announced its dis-
satisfaction with the fact that the Commission insists on
using its right to decide whether or not to consult
advisory expert groups. The Court stated that the drafting
and adaptation of Community rules is founded on
scientific and technical assessments which must
themselves be based on the results of the latest
international research. In carrying out such assessments,
the Commission should therefore consult experts on
scientific and technical issues because neither the
Commission nor the comitology committees, which
generally comprise representatives of the Member States,
are in the position to carry out the type of assessment
required. According to the Court, this means that the
consultation of expert groups may be mandatory in
some cases to ensure that measures adopted at
Community level are both necessary and adapted to the
objective of protecting human health as pursued by the
legislative act in question.
The object of this article is not to describe the
Comitology decision 87/373/EEC or to explain the
different committee procedures as this has already been
done elsewhere.11 The intention is more to look into the
“daily life” of the comitology committees from the
point of view of a national civil servant and to analyse
their working methods, rules of procedure, style of
negotiation and composition. There will be a critical
assessment of the comitology committees in the
environmental sector in terms of their efficiency and
effectiveness, and against the background of the
discussions on the democratic deficit in the EU. The
article will conclude with some realistic proposals as to
how the comitology system can be reformed.
2. “Comitology” in the Environmental Sector
In EC environmental law an initial distinction should be
made between the approximately 130-150 legal acts of
the Council and the amending acts of the Council (or the
Council and the Parliament) within the official legislative
procedure and the approximately 100 implementation
acts of the Commission and the Council within the
executive procedure (on the legal basis of Article 145,
third indent and the Comitology decision 87/373/EEC
of July 1987).12
The spectrum of executive measures set up by the
implementation acts covers:
• adaptation to technical progress, mainly by
amending the annexes (for example Council
Directive 91/676 concerning the protection of waters
against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural
sources; Directive 94/67 EC on the incineration of
hazardous waste);
• the evaluation of standards and substances and the
establishment of lists (Directive 94/62/EC on
packaging and packaging waste);
• approval of funds (in the case of the LIFE-
committee, Art. 13 of Regulation 1973/92 of 21
May 1992, modified by 1404/96);
• rule-making activities of an abstract general type
(for example plans on how to protect the
Community’s forests from pollution, Commission
Regulation 836/94 of 13 April 1994);
• decisions regarding the lifting of import bans or the
fixing of quotas for substances and stipulations for
the use of certain substances (to be put on the
market) (Regulation 3093/94 on substances that
deplete the ozone layer);
• collection of data (Council Directive 92/43 on the16
conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna
and flora).
According to the budget, the total number of
comitology committees in the environmental sector has
increased from 0 in 1975 to 17 in 1985 and 34 in 1998.
However, Directorate-General XI itself lists 36
comitology committees, of which 20 were active in the
year 1995.13 Among the different comitology committees
one can differentiate between advisory committees,
management committees (Type IIa or Type IIb) and
regulatory committees (Type IIIa or Type IIIb). The
relationship between the Member States’ officials within
these committees and the European Commission is
different in each of the three committees and the five
procedures.
• Within an advisory committee, the Commission
only has to take the opinion of the committee “into
utmost consideration” before it implements its draft
measure.
• Within a management committee, the Commission
can only be prevented from proceeding with its
draft measure if there is a qualified majority of the
Member States’ votes against the Commission
proposal. If this is the case, the Commission may
implement the measure if the Council does not take
a different decision within one month (Type II–a).
In a IIb committee the Commission must defer the
implementation of its proposal up to three months.
The Council will then have three months to take
another decision by qualified majority.
• “In contrast, within a regulatory committee, the
Commission needs a qualified majority of the
Member States’ votes for its proposed measure (62
out of 87 votes)”.14 If this is not the case the
Commission will have to present a proposal to the
Council, which can either accept the proposal or
override it by unanimity (IIIa procedure). In
addition, in the regulatory committee (Type IIIb)
the Council can also override the proposal of the
Commission by simple majority. “Clearly, the last
type, particularly the IIIb version, within which the
Council can pull the ‘emergency brake’, the
Commission’s freedom to act is limited”.15 In the
environmental sector, nearly all comitology
committees are regulatory committees (Type IIIa
or Type IIIb).
2.1 Voting procedures and implementation practice
in the environmental sector
According to the only official sources from 1995 the 20
committees which met in 1995 issued 35 opinions, of
which 30 were positive and 5 not positive, i.e. did not
reach a qualified majority in favour (approx. 17%).16
There are several reasons why one should hesitate
before assuming that the official figures give a realistic
picture of the exact number of comitology committees
and voting procedures.
Several studies on comitology committees show
how the working procedures are clearly geared towards
consensus. Statistically, voting patterns indicate that
over 90% of all opinions expressed were favourable
towards the Commission’s position.17 These statistics
are generally interpreted as showing that voting patterns
do not necessarily imply the dominance of the
Commission but more that the Commission tends to
make proposals acceptable for the Member States. On
the other hand, the comitology committees do not want
to rely on the Council (politicians) to intervene.18 Another
reason is that contrary to what “scholars (and even
European institutions) had believed for a long time, the
IIIa and even the IIb procedure provide the Commission
with quite a strong position”.19 This argument can be
illustrated by three practical cases:
(a) During a 1995 meeting of the so-called Article 19
Committee (IIIa) established by the Council
Regulation (EEC) 1836/93 of 1993 (OJ 1993 L
168/1) (the so-called EMAS-regulation) the
Commission did not obtain a qualified majority in
favour of its proposal (there were only 48 votes in
favour). Germany, Italy and Austria voted against,
Spain, Greece and Luxembourg abstained. Hence,
the Commission had to refer the decision back to
the Council which, in a meeting held in December
1995, could neither reach a qualified majority in
favour of the proposal nor unanimity against it.
Consequently, the Commission adopted the
proposal in February 1996 (OJ 1996 L 34/42).
(b) Another interesting case concerned the imple-
mentation of Directive 91/689/EEC on hazardous
waste within a regulatory committee (Art. 18 of
Directive 75/442/EEC as amended – Type IIIa).
The initial proposal of the Commission to implement
the Directive (with the aim of establishing a list of
hazardous waste) was not approved by qualified
majority by the committee and therefore had to be
referred to the Council. The Council had to decide
on the proposal by 21 December 1994 at the latest
but could not reach an agreement (especially)
because of the negative position of the United
Kingdom.20 This time the Commission did not
adopt its original proposal but gave the Council
another opportunity to find a solution!!!
Consequently, the Council established a list of
hazardous substances (OJ L 2356/14 of 31.12.1994).
(c) As regards the IIb procedure, the Commission had
no problem overcoming the resistance of the
Member States when it came to implementing
Directive 91/672/EEC of 23 December 1991 (OJ L
377 of 31.12.1991). One proposal of the
Commission to implement the Directive on the
standardisation and rationalisation of reports on
the implementation of certain directives went very
far and was not accepted by many of the Member
States. In addition, when it came to vote on the
proposal not all Member States showed up at the
meeting. The result was that although the overall
attitude towards the proposal was very negative the17
remaining Member States could not reach a negative
opinion. Consequently, the Commission imple-
mented its proposal.
The voting patterns in the above-mentioned cases
indicate that the impressive record of consensual voting
behaviour does not necessarily mean that there are no
conflicts between the Member States and the
Commission within the committees. The voting practice
in the environmental sector shows however that the
position of the Commission is stronger than expected
even in policy fields (such as the environmental sector)
where the vast majority of committees are regulatory
ones. On the other hand, the Member States seem for a
long time to have neglected the problem of the Council
having to vote unanimously against a Commission
proposal in the case of a IIIa procedure (if the committee
has not approved it beforehand).
2.2 The secret life of comitology or the problem of
intransparency and complexity
Much of the administrative and policy-making work of
the Community has, until very recently, been
characterised by secrecy. Working documents and
protocols of committee sessions have rarely seen the
light of day and it has been very difficult for researchers
to gain access to internal committee documents, either
from the Council or the Commission. Together with the
immense complexity of the various procedures, this in
no way creates the transparency which is supposedly
one of the main new objectives of improving EC
legislation. Sometimes even those experts who represent
their countries in these committees have difficulty in
identifying the exact type and form of the committee.
There are various possible reasons for this:
• The different committees meet together
Lots of committees meet together on matters in which
they have a common interest and common competences.
For example, Article 1 of the rules of procedure for the
“Habitats Committee” (92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992)
provides for joint meetings with the scientific and
technical committee for the purposes of modifying
Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds.
The same procedure is foreseen in the Committee set up
under Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 and
the Urban Waste Water Committee 91/271/EEC of 21
May 1991 (as authorised by Article 9 of Council Directive
91/676/EEC).
• The committees established by the budget do not
meet at all
One interesting case is that of the Drinking Water
Directive 80/778/EEC,21 Articles 14 and 15 of which set
up a committee to deal with the adaptation of the rather
unimportant Annex III. Because of its limited
competences, the committee never convened, although
in the Community budget it is listed as a IIIb committee
(with a budget of ECU 10,000 for the financial year
1996). In the actual text of the Directive however the
committee is not defined as a IIIb committee. The
Commission proposal – not yet adopted by the Council
– to revise the Drinking Water Directive now provides
for the creation of a IIb committee.22
• The same committee may be allocated tasks by
several legal acts.
Most of the legal acts in the environmental sector
decided on by the Council make provision for the
establishment of a comitology committee. However, it
appears that very often one committee is allocated the
task of implementing several legal acts.
In the air sector  for example, the regulatory
committee (IIIa) set up under Directive 96/62 EC of
27.9.1996 has implemented Directive 80/779/EEC,
Directive 82/884/EEC and Directive 85/203/EEC.
Furthermore, the regulatory committee (IIIa) in Directive
79/113/EEC decided on the implementation of 7 legal
acts.
In the waste sector, a single comitology committee
(the waste committee set up under Directive 75/442/
EEC, as amended) exercises implementing powers for
the most important aspects of the Community’s waste
management policy. Despite this impressive con-
centration of power within one committee, evidence has
shown that committees are even more important in the
case of other European Union policies. In the food
sector for example, some 35 directives and regulations
make reference to the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs.
In his analysis of the food sector, Falke has identified
117 different groups of tasks.23
• The committees change their nature when it comes
to voting on a certain proposal
Very often, comitology committees only exist when it
comes to the vote on a formal proposal. Representatives
of European interest groups are generally invited to
participate in committee sessions. The same applies to
environmental groups, though they are rarely present.
In some cases (such as the case of the Article 19
Committee of the EMAS regulation) the committee acts
as an advisory committee as long as it is composed by
various groups. The comitology committee only exists
when it comes to a formal vote and even then only
national delegations are allowed to participate.24
This mixture of working group and comitology
committee sometimes makes it very difficult for national
civil servants to know when they have to act as a
representative of a Member State within a comitology
committee and when as an independent national expert.
• The committees may set up information exchange
groups and technical sub-groups
Nearly every rule of procedure of the different
comitology committees allows for ad-hoc groups,
technical groups or informal groups to be set up or for
experts to be invited to discuss special technical issues.
The IPPC – Comitology Committee is supplemented18
with an IPPC Information Exchange Forum and by
Technical Working Groups. Furthermore, Article 10 of
the Rules of Procedure provides the option of inviting
experts. For some representatives these distinctions
between the different groups (committees, technical
groups, scientific groups, etc.) are not very clear
especially in view of the fact that they sometimes meet
at the time or on the same floor.
3. Negotiating comitology – the power struggle
between the institutions
3.1  Difference in opinion as to what sort of committee
to set up
There is regular disagreement as to the appropriate
committee procedure, with the Commission and the
Parliament favouring advisory and management
committees and the Council generally favouring
regulatory committees. The Council’s stance ensures
that the Member States have the chance of having some
influence on the proceedings. As a rule, the Commission
itself proposes advisory committee procedures for the
exercise of implementing powers under Article 100a
TEU.25 For proposals not relating to the Internal Market
it is also possible to envisage a IIa, IIb or even a IIIa
committee. The choice between these types depends on
the type of measure to be adopted and the requirements
of the sector in question. For example, in its proposed
directive on the new water framework directive, the
Commission has proposed a IIIa procedure.26 Yet once
a common position with the Parliament and the Council
has been achieved, it seems to be quite arbitrary as to
what type of committee is finally set up under the
committee procedure of any given directive.
3.2 The problem of the Council delegating imple-
menting powers to itself –Directive 91/414/EEC
Furthermore, within EC environment law it is not always
clear on what basis the Council confers or does not confer
implementing powers on the Commission. In those cases
where the Council has assumed implementing powers
for itself and acted in the absence of formal parliamentary
participation, it has been tempted to circumvent previous
legislative decisions. This happened when, in the context
of the implementation of the Pesticide Directive 91/414/
EEC, the Council approved the infiltration of pesticides
in groundwater at a rate which went beyond the limits
set by the Drinking Water Directive.
The Parliament protested against the continued
procedure for the implementation of this directive and,
consequently, the Court of Justice annulled the Council
Implementation Act 94/43/EC of 27 July 1994, in case
C-303/94 of 18 June 1996. The Court held that the
Council could not be required to draw up all details of
regulations or directives. It was therefore sufficient for
only the essential elements of the matter to be dealt with
to have been adopted in the legislative process. On the
other hand, the Court held that the implementing directive
did not respect the provisions enacted in the basic
directive and that the provisions of the contested directive
had been amended without the Parliament having been
consulted. Consequently, the Court decided that the
Parliament’s prerogatives had been violated and that the
directive therefore had to be annulled.
3.3 The power struggle between the Member States in
the Council
Finally, there is no general agreement within the Council
as regards the setting up of a certain comitology
procedure.
In the case of the amendment of the Drinking Water
Directive 80/778/EEC, in an early draft proposal of
1994 the Commission proposed a IIb Committee for the
implementation of annexes II and III. Later on, in its
official proposal 94 (612) the committee procedure was
changed into a IIa one. In its first reading, the Parliament
made an amendment and asked to be informed and
formally involved in the implementation of the Directive
according to the comitology procedure (a reference was
made to the Modus-Vivendi (OJ C 102, 4.4.1996) in the
text). This request was rejected by the Commission in its
amended proposal 97(228) in which – interestingly! –
the Commission proposed that the Parliament be only
informed (according to the Plumb-Delors Agreement)
about the implementation of the Directive.
The positions of the various Member States concerning
the committee procedure varied considerably. In the
Council Working group of 12 September 1997, only the
United Kingdom agreed on a IIa Procedure whereas
Germany and Italy preferred a IIb procedure. Denmark
requested a IIIb procedure. All of the other Member
States reserved their opinion. Later on in a Council
working group of 10 October 1997 the Dutch chair
suggested that a IIb procedure be set up. However, the
Commission insisted on a IIa procedure. Austria was
now asking for a IIIa procedure to be set up and France
even for a IIIb procedure. Finally, in December 1997 the
Council was able to agree on a IIb procedure. However,
in its second reading the European Parliament again
made reference to the Modus Vivendi of April 1996 and
requested the introduction of a completely new type of
comitology procedure in the text. In addition, it asked
for the committee to meet in public, to publish the
agenda two weeks in advance and to publish the minutes
for the meeting.
At the time of writing, the Council has not yet
reacted to this new proposal (see Table 1) .
4. Composition of committees and rules of
procedure
In general, all comitology committees in the
environmental sector are composed of two governmental
experts per Member State, although the wording of the
texts and the rules of procedure do not oblige the
committees to be exclusively composed of governmental
experts but also allow private and scientific experts. The
rules of procedure of the Urban Waste Water Committee
allow each Member State to be represented by no more19
than 4 officials. Contrary to this, Article 6 of the rules of
procedure of the IPPC-Directive allow each Member
State to send one representative to the Committee (the
Commission only pays the costs of one representative).
In addition, whilst one would expect national civil
servants to be members of the comitology committees,
this is not always the case. Committees may include
“representatives of the Member States”, “highly qualified
persons”, “experts” or “experts from the private sector”.
As regards the composition of the committees, one has
to bear in mind the distinction between comitology
committees and scientific committees, whose task is
mainly to advise the Commission and the comitology
committee on the implementation of certain aspects. In
the environmental sector, the most important scientific
committee is the Scientific Committee for Toxicity,
Ecotoxicity and the Environment. Its members are
exclusively scientists from institutes and universities
who are appointed by the Commission (Decision 97/
579/EC of 23 July 1997).27
Generally, the rules of procedure on the composition
of the committees merely give a rough idea of who is to
represent the Member States, which agendas are to be
discussed or which formal rules of procedure are to be
followed. The rules of procedure allow lots of committees
to create subgroups composed of independent experts
and lobbyists. The members of the committees are
generally appointed by national administrations,
although in some cases they are appointed by the
Commission (Art. 4 of Decision L 105/29 of 26.4.1988).
The committees usually meet at the Commission’s
headquarters in Brussels (Borchette-building) or
Luxembourg (Plateau Kirchberg), although exceptions
to this are possible (Art. 9 of OJ L 105/29 of 26.4.1988).
The Commission’s duties as regards convening the
meetings, the time limit for distributing the agenda and
materials to the Member States are very different and
depend on the rules of procedure of the respective
committee. The rules of procedure of the Habitat
Committee for example require that the agenda and
materials be sent out 21 days before the meeting, in
special cases 10 working days, in the case of the Urban
Waste Water Committee this is 35 days (Art. 3 RP), in
special cases 21 days, and the LIFE Committee
(Regulation 1973/92 of 21.5.1992) and the draft proposal
for the IPPC-Committee both specify 35 days in advance
(Art. 3), in special cases 10 days and 14 days respectively.
As regards time arrangements, in case C-263/95 of 10
February 1998 the Court of Justice ruled that the deadlines
stated in the rules of procedure must be respected by the
European Commission (and therefore that there is no
possibility of shortening the period of notice without the
approval of the Member States). Furthermore, the Court
ruled that the Member States should have the necessary
time to study the documents, that these documents
should (also) be sent to the Permanent Representatives
of the Member States (and not only to the members of
the committee) and that they should be drafted in the
language of each State.28
5. The Council and the scope of delegation powers
in the environmental sector
In the environmental sector, the Council has for a long
time attached great importance to regulating matters
itself in the legislative process as much as possible (such
as timetables and annexes in the directives 70/220 EEC,
76/769 EEC, 70/157 EEC, 76/464 EEC etc.), primarily
because the powers of the Parliament were previously
only of a consultative nature. In some very sensitive
areas (such as in the case of the implementation of
Annexes I to V in Directive 92/43/EC on the conservation
of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora), the
Council has assumed implementing powers for itself
(without stating in detail why it was doing so). In the
case of Directive 76/464/EEC on dangerous substances
discharged into the aquatic environment, the Council
did not delegate any implementation powers. In addition,
no committee was set up in the basic text of Directive 76/
464/EEC. As a consequence, very little has come of the
further amendment and implementation of Directive
76/464/EEC. So far, emission limits and environmental
quality standards have been laid down for only 18 of the
130 priority “black substances” in altogether 6 Council
directives.29 After the last amendment of this directive,
no further measures were taken, probably because after
the ratification of the Single European Act the Council
had to decide by qualified majority (Art. 100a of the
Treaty establishing the European Community).
This is a very poor result, particularly in view of the
fact that no less than 1500 dangerous substances qualify
for inclusion on the “black list” of the directive. This
very slow decision-making process can be explained by
the fact that it was the Council of Ministers who always
had to amend the directive in the legislative process. On
the other hand, it was not possible to speed up the
procedure because no committee was laid down in the
basic act 76/464/EEC. Furthermore, following the
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the Council
required the involvement of the Parliament and qualified
majority voting (according to the co-decision procedure)
if it wanted to amend the directive and to include a
comitology procedure. There was apparently never
enough political will to do so. The Commission now
intends to include Directive 76/464/EEC and its
implementation acts in the new water framework
directive (COM (97) 49, OJ 184/97).
Despite these examples, it has become clear in the
nineties that the Council’s practice of assuming the
responsibility for regulation as much as possible has
come to an end. It now seems to be the case that the
Council generally delegates very broad powers to the
Commission, mainly to relieve its own workload (such
as in the case of Directive UVP 85/337, the Nitrate
Directive 91/676 or the Urban Waste Water Directive
91/271), or in order to escape the growing influence of
the Parliament in the legislative process. The latter
argument is supported by the empirical findings of
Dogan who shows that in the period 1987-1995 a
comitology committee was set up for only 16.7% of all20
the legal acts decided according to the consultation
procedure. On the other hand, in those cases where the
cooperation and co-decision procedure were applied, a
comitology committee was established for 49.6% of all
acts.30 Only in some cases is the Council not willing to
delegate broad powers (such as in the case of Directive
96/61/EC on integrated pollution prevention and
control).
It has been shown over the last few years in particular
that the basic legal texts of the Council often use an
exceptional amount of vague legal concepts and offer
derogation clauses for the national systems. Using
wording such as “the Member State may adapt to
technical process the directive” the European legislator
therefore does not clearly delimit the delegation of
implementing powers. On the other hand, this practice
gives the Commission broad powers of implementation
by means of the comitology committees.31
6. Comitology and the quality of the legal acts
From the point of view of the national administrations
charged with applying the legal acts, constant adaptation,
amendment and implementation – as in the case of
Directives 67/548/EEC, 70/220/EEC and 76/769/EEC
– contributes considerably to the fragmentation of law
and poses immense problems for the civil servants in the
Member States who have to implement and apply them.32
A good example of this is Directive 67/548/EEC. The
Commission, in its 14th report on the control of the
application of Community law, had to admit that the
Member States had difficulty in keeping up with the
constant amendments to the directive and incorporating
the technical adaptations into their legal systems.33 The
Commission has adapted Directive 67/54834 to technical
progress 17 times. The Council itself dealt with the
technical adaptation twice because the Commission
proposal was blocked by the implementation committee
on the eighth and eleventh adaptation to technical
progress of the Directive. Furthermore, the Council
itself adapted the Directive to technical progress several
times and amended it seven times. The last time Directive
67/548 was amended completely was the seventh
amendment (Directive 92/32). All in all, this Directive
has been amended and adapted 27 times.35 In order to
improve the situation, the Directive is now in the process
of consolidation (almost 2000 pages long).
The Council also amended Directive 76/769 EEC36
on restrictions on the marketing and use of chemicals 16
times, mainly by enlarging or altering the annexes to
include certain substances (for example by means of the
well-known PCP Directive 91/173). Directive 70/220/
EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to measures to be taken against air
pollution by gases from positive ignition engines of
motor vehicles37 was implemented by the Commission
twice and amended by the Council seven times (including
Council Directive 74/290/EEC38 which had to be decided
upon by the Council because the comitology committee
blocked it).
However, the greatest problem is still that many
rules appear to overlap one another. In this respect it still
has to be seen whether especially the Directive 96/61/
EC on integrated pollution and control and the proposed
new Water Framework Directive (COM (97) 49 final)
might help in the future. More generally, from the point
of view of legal clarity it would seem necessary to
publish an updated version of the implemented basic act
with every implementation act.
Finally, the clarity, and therefore applicability, of
the provisions in the annexes is decreasing rapidly as the
number of changes increases. The reason for this is that
the changing legal act often mentions only the change in
the annex itself, and not the complete new version of the
annex now applicable. Therefore, one has to obtain an
overall view of all changing legal acts and make a
comparison in order to be able to understand the technical
provisions of the annex.
7. Conclusion
The concept of the separation of powers and democracy
in general has been developed for the classical and
sovereign national state but not for international
organisations such as the European Union. The famous
judgment of the German Constitutional Court on the
Treaty of Maastricht was a good illustration of how
many difficulties are involved in defining democracy in
a “denationalised world”.39
International organisations continuously gain
competences and decision-making powers without
creating well-developed democratic structures at the
same time. Furthermore, international organisations
and agencies lack public identification and support
because of their technocratic decision-making
procedures and geographical distance from the citizens.
The German Constitutional Court has therefore invented
the artificial notion of “Staatenverbund” (somewhat
more than a confederation and somewhat less than a
federation of states) in order to define the European
Union. This term is trying to identify an organisation
which is not a federal state (and will probably not
develop into one) nor a typical international organisation.
Both the Member States and the European
Institutions seek to balance their interests and powers in
this “Staatenverbund”:
• As regards comitology, the Council of the European
Union is happy with the current structure because
it means that the “overloaded” Ministers do not
have to decide on every detail in the legislative
process. The delegation of wide implementation
powers to the comitology committees does not
pose a threat to national sovereignty because the
large number of regulatory committees guarantees
that the national administrations may – if they want
– exercise a maximum of control over the
implementation activities of the European
Commission. Furthermore, the more powers the
Council delegates, the more the Ministers of the
European Union can escape from the growing21
influence of the European Parliament in the
legislative process.
• The European Commission is happy because the
Council – in order to discharge itself from its heavy
workload – has been tempted to delegate very
broad implementation powers to the Commission.
Furthermore, despite some difficulties the
negotiation style in the comitology committees
seems to be more consensual and the Commission
can push through most of its proposals. Furthermore,
the large number of IIIa committees within the
environmental sector guarantees that the Com-
mission’s proposals can be overridden only by
unanimity in the Council (in the case that the
Commission does not get 62 votes in favour of its
proposed measure).
• The European Parliament has certainly been
unhappy for a long time as it was excluded from all
implementation activities. Nowadays, things have
changed gradually because both the European
Commission and the Council have – since the
signing of the Treaty of Maastricht – been under
more and more pressure from the Parliament and
they have already made concessions to the European
Parliament.40 However, these concessions are of an
informal nature. The new proposal of the European
Commission41 (with the objective of reforming the
provisions of the Treaty relating to implementing
measures) is very ambivalent in this respect and
provides a greater informal but not necessarily a
greater formal role for the European Parliament. It
firstly proposes that the Parliament should be
informed of committee proceedings on a regular
basis. Secondly, if the Commission does not receive
a qualified majority for its proposal in the regulatory
procedure, it may present a proposal. Only in this
case will the Parliament be formally involved
according to the Treaty provisions (e.g. Artt. 189c
and 189b TEC). As the Commission is not legally
obliged to do so, the question remains whether it
will present a new proposal. Only if the Commission
presents a proposal will the role of the European
Parliament increase. It will then be a question of
whether this proposal of the European Commission
will be acceptable to the Council of Ministers but
especially to the European Parliament.
Comitology shows that academic questions such as
whether Europe might move towards more federalism
or intergovernmentalism are highly abstract debates.
The present characteristics of European integration are
dominated by the growing influence of the European
and the national executives in the policy-making process
of the EU (within the broader context of the growing
influence of “experts” in international organisations in
general). With this in mind, one could say that the
growing importance of the European integration process
is developing in parallel with the growing influence of
the Member States in “Brussels”42 and at the same time
the impact of “Europe” in the national administrations.
This can best be illustrated by the growing number of
comitology committees (in the environmental sector)
whose decisions have an enormous impact on the national
legal, political and economical systems of the Member
States. These committees guarantee that the Member
States have resort to considerable “blocking power”
against the Commission in the executive process. On the
other hand, regulatory committees have not hindered
the Commission to push through the vast majority of its
proposals.
A more profound controversy surrounds the fact
that “comitology” touches upon an elementary aspect of
Community law, namely the institutional balance. More
generally speaking, the balance of power between the
institutions and the Member States, and between the
institutions themselves, has altered in significant ways.
Criticising this reality would mean offering an
alternative. But what would be this alternative be?
Regulating in the legislative process as detailed as
possible (and consequently giving more powers to both
the Council and the European Parliament?) or delegating
even more powers to agencies and standardisation
bodies? None of the two solutions would seem to
respond to the problem.
The Council and the European Parliament have
neither the political will, the expertise, nor the structure
to decide alone on detailed legislative and/or
implementation acts.
As regards the proposal to delegate more powers to
agencies, in its Meroni decision the ECJ43 set up obstacles
to the decision-making powers of regulatory agencies.
The delegation to standardisation bodies would lead to
even more intransparency and decisions would be left to
experts and interest groups.
Obviously the issue of committees and comitology
needs a combined (and not separate) answer to the
question as to how the European Union addresses the
question of effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and
– within this context – democracy.44
As regards the question of effectiveness, one might
say that the fact that European and national experts
rather than politicians take the decisions might be good
for the overall state of the environment because
politicians are not experts and cannot judge important
technical questions. Therefore, politicians and diplomats
should decide only on the essential questions. On the
other hand, some observers argue that the system of
committees should be seen as enhancing the effectiveness
and efficiency of the Community’s institutional structure
in that it provides a link between the Member States and
the Community administrations. The development of
networks and the involvement of national experts in the
implementation process at European level should have
a positive effect on the implementation of EC
environmental law.
Although this observation is certainly true, the
complexity of the different committees ranging from
advisory committees to regulatory committees (Type22
IIIb) and the various complicated procedures could be
seen as a bureaucratic mechanism which is robbing the
Community decision-making process of its last vestiges
of democratic accountability. Democratic legitimation
therefore needs reinforcement. But how? Whilst during
the seventies and eighties commentators on the
“democratic deficit” of the EC almost unanimously
supported the strengthening of the European and the
national parliaments, the focus has meanwhile shifted to
one of activating the citizens, decentralising powers and
the access to the courts, enabling access to documents
and information, opening up the meetings of the Council
of Ministers, etc.45
This shift of attention is important as the future will
very much depend on the question how international
organisations can be made visible, accountable and
transparent to the citizens. In the European Union the
element of transparency, or rather, the lack of
transparency, is a moot point when it comes to
comitology. At least one (very modest) proposal to
increase transparency would be to “streamline” the
hundreds of different rules of procedures and provide
for clearer and standardised rules of procedures.
Furthermore, the Commission should publish an
overview of the different types of Committees in the
environmental sector, their composition, tasks,
competences etc. Especially in the field of comitology,
a comprehensive guide should be published explaining
in which cases which committees assume the function
to implement several acts (like the “Art. 18 Committee”
in the waste sector) and in which cases they act as an
advisory committee, a management committee (type a
or type b) or a regulatory committee (type a or type b).
Furthermore, in those cases where the comitology
committees create sub-groups these groups should be
composed beside the representatives from (industrial)
lobby groups as well of experts from environmental
NGOs.
If international organisations continue to develop
intransparent technocratic decision-making processes,
they will increasingly loose public support. On the other
hand, the citizens have to become active themselves
(why not together with the parliaments) at international
level and develop “their” concepts for international
organisations. Who knows, in ten years’ time there may
be mass demonstrations against the decision-making
procedures in global institutions.
RÉSUMÉ
La comitologie ne désigne en aucun cas ce que la simple
analyse du mot pourrait laisser supposer. Il ne s’agit
pas d’une science des comités, mais d’une pratique très
réaliste et complexe permettant aux exécutifs nationaux
et européen de décider sur de nombreuses questions
techniques. Au regard du fonctionnement du pouvoir
exécutif au sein des Etats, un tel système peut apparaître
comme le triomphe de la bureaucratie au détriment de
la démocratie. Cet article essaie d’analyser la
comitologie dans le domaine de la politique de
l’environnement.
__________________
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